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MPs	and	outside	business	interests:	the	value	of
political-corporate	connections
In	2002,	an	amendment	to	parliamentary	regulations	removed	restrictions	on	the
participation	of	MPs	in	proceedings	related	to	their	corporate	interests.	Colin	Green
and	Swarnodeep	Homroy	demonstrate	how	both	firms	and	politicians	changed	their
behaviour	as	a	result.	Post-amendment,	firms	were	more	likely	to	appoint	MPs	on	their
boards	and	reduce	political	donations.	MPs	with	corporate	connections	were	more	likely
to	become	members	and	attend	meetings	of	select	and	joint	committees.
In	October	2019,	The	Guardian	reported	that	oil	companies	and	climate	contrarian	businessmen	had	given	at	least
£5m	to	MPs	over	the	past	decade	in	the	form	of	donations,	expenses-paid	trips,	and	salaries.	This	may	seem	a
small	detail	in	the	ongoing	churn	of	the	Brexit	and	COVID-19	news	cycles,	but	it	is	one	that	shouldn’t	go	unnoticed.
The	interaction	of	the	corporate	sector	and	political	representation	is	a	highly	controversial	and	important	issue.	At
its	core	lies	the	concern	that	these	interactions	lead	to	the	‘co-option’	of	politicians	by	large	corporations,	and	that
politicians	will	prioritise	their	own	corporate	interests	over	the	interests	of	their	electorate.
In	our	research,	we	examine	the	effects	of	corporate	connections	of	MPs.	On	14	May	2002,	a	legislative
amendment	came	into	place	in	the	UK	which	allowed	MPs	with	outside	business	interests	to	initiate	parliamentary
proceedings	on	issues	that	are	related	to	their	registered	business	interests.	This	occurred	in	a	setting	where
almost	half	of	the	top	50	public	companies	in	the	UK	had	connections	with	a	sitting	MP.	Beyond	showing	a	return	to
these	political	connections	to	companies,	we	demonstrate	marked	changes	in	both	firm	and	politician	behaviour	as
the	value	of	political	connections	increases.	We	do	this	in	the	context	of	a	developed,	low	corruption	economy.
Although	stylised	results	show	that	the	benefits	of	political	connection	are	more	pronounced	in	countries	with	weak
legal	systems,	recent	papers	show	that	even	in	developed	economies	such	as	the	UK	political	connections	can
have	substantial	effects.
The	UK	provides	an	attractive	setting	to	examine	the	value	of	political-corporate	connections.	On	the	one	hand,	it
has	strong	legal	protection	and	low	corruption:	it	was	ranked	the	twelfth	least	corrupt	country	in	the	world	in	2019	on
the	Corruption	Perception	Index.	At	the	same	time,	within	this	low-corruption	setting,	46%	of	the	top	50	public
corporations	have	connections	with	a	serving	MP,	and	connected	companies	form	39%	of	market	capitalisation.	In
comparison,	the	figures	for	the	US	are	6%	and	4%,	respectively.	Globally,	only	Russia	and	Thailand	have	a	higher
fraction	of	market	capitalisation	of	politically	connected	companies.
To	measure	the	effects	of	this	amendment	in	parliamentary	regulations	we	used	data-mining	techniques	to	study
the	financial	performance,	stock	valuation,	board	composition	and	director	backgrounds	of	FTSE	350	companies,
as	well	as	details	about	parliamentary	committee	attendance	and	activities	of	MPs.	We	cross-referenced	this	with
the	list	of	members	of	the	House	of	Commons	and	House	of	Lords,	their	declared	business	interests,	and	the
composition	of	key	committees	linked	to	government	contracts	and	regulatory	affairs,	such	as	on	defence,	trade,
and	economic	affairs.	Since	the	skills	and	expertise	of	MPs	are	unlikely	to	be	influenced	by	the	regulation,	at	least
in	the	short	run,	this	empirical	strategy	should	solely	capture	the	returns	to	the	change	in	political	access	of
companies.
Companies	with	existing	connections	to	MPs	experienced	higher	stock	returns	in	the	three-day	window	[-1,+1]
surrounding	14	May	2002	when	parliament	passed	the	amendment.	Figure	1	illustrates	the	substantial	returns	for
firms	connected	to	MPs	compared	to	unconnected	firms	on	that	date.
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In	the	longer	term,	we	find	that	companies	with	MPs	as	directors	or	consultants	experienced	a	substantial	gain	in
value	compared	to	unconnected	companies	following	the	introduction	of	this	legislation.	These	returns	were	more
significant	for	firms	where	influence	may	be	more	important,	for	instance,	those	with	concentrated	(family)
ownership,	low	attention	to	corporate	and	social	responsibility,	poorer	environmental	performance,	and	less
transparent	accounting	practices.	Figure	2	illustrates	the	gain	in	value	for	UK	companies	connected	to	MPs
compared	to	companies	that	had	no	such	connections	when	the	amendment	was	passed.	In	contrast,	companies
with	links	to	politicians	not	affected	by	this	amendment	(including	Members	of	European	Parliament,	ex-MPs,	etc.)
did	not	gain	in	value	after	the	amendment.
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Beyond	these	increased	financial	returns,	we	demonstrate	substantial	changes	in	the	behaviour	of	both
corporations	and	politicians	resulting	from	the	amendment.	For	example,	following	the	amendment,	politically
connected	companies	reduced	donations	to	political	parties.	This	highlights	the	value	of	direct	access	to
policymaking	that	was	facilitated	by	the	2002	bill,	and	hence	the	reduced	influence	value	of	political	donations.
Additionally,	we	detect	an	increase	in	MPs	with	corporate	affiliations.	In	particular,	MPs	with	no	connections	before
the	amendment	and	with	higher	electoral	majorities	were	more	likely	to	gain	a	corporate	affiliation	afterwards.	MPs
with	links	to	companies	were	also	more	likely	to	obtain	appointments	to	major	parliamentary	committees	and,
conditional	on	this,	more	likely	to	attend	meetings:	MPs	with	pre-2002	corporate	affiliations	were	up	to	23
percentage	points	more	likely	to	be	appointed	to	select	committees	after	the	amendment	when	compared	with	MPs
without	prior	corporate	affiliations.	This	paints	a	clear	picture	of	manoeuvres	to	act	upon	this	increased	access	to
parliamentary	influence.
We	find	no	evidence	that	the	higher	demand	in	the	corporate	world	leads	to	increased	monetary	gains	for	MPs.	This
could	be	due	to	concerns	about	electoral	and	media	attention,	low	discretionary	components	in	non-executive
directors’	pay,	or	companies	using	non-traditional	forms	of	compensation	that	we	simply	do	not	observe.
Additionally,	one	reason	for	politicians	to	gain	corporate	connections	may	be	better	post-political	career	labour
market	prospects.
To	what	extent	is	the	corporate	clientism	of	elected	politicians	socially	desirable?	As	we	see	from	our	results,	the
companies	that	benefit	more	from	political	connections	are	not	the	best	corporate	citizens	(for	example,	those	with
poor	environmental	performance	and	opaque	accounting	standards).	The	role	of	large	corporations	in	influencing
democratic	processes	is	increasingly	coming	under	scrutiny.	Our	results	have	implications	for	the	design	of	policy
aimed	at	regulating	and/or	restricting	these	political	and	corporate	interactions,	particularly	in	light	of	the	substitution
between	the	different	forms	of	corporate	political	connections.
____________________
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